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Abstract 
Within the possibilistic approach to uncer­
tainty modeling, the paper presents a modal 
logical system to reason about qualitative 
(comparative) statements of the possibility 
(and necessity) of fuzzy propositions. We re­
late this qualitative modal logic to the many­
valued analogues MVS5 and MVKD45 of the 
well known modal logics of knowledge and be­
lief 55 and KD45 respectively. Completeness 
results are obtained for such logics and there­
fore, they extend previous existing results for 
qualitative possibilistic logics in the classical 
non-fuzzy setting. 
Keywords: Possibilistic Logic, Fuzzy Logic, 
Qualitative Possibility, Many-valued Modal 
Logic. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the recent past, a lot of effort has been put in re­
lating numerical and symbolic approaches to uncer­
tain reasoning. Numerical formalisms attach degrees 
of belief to propositions. Belief degrees are understood 
as a measure on the set of possible worlds (possible 
state descriptions) that assigns to every proposition 
the measure of the set of worlds in which the proposi­
tion is true. Therefore, uncertainty measures are not 
truth-functional, as it is welt known and established, 
i.e. the measure of a compound formula can not be in 
general obtained as a function of the measures of its 
subformulas. 
Possibilistic logic ( cf. e.g. [Dubois & Prade, 88]) is 
a particular numerical formalism based on the use of 
the so-called possibility and necessity measures that 
provide to what extent a crisp piece of knowledge can 
be considered plausible and certain respectively. Even 
if formulas bear numerical possibilities, we may be in­
terested not in the values themselves but only in their 
comparison, i.e. in formulas such as A <l B saying 
for instance that B is at least as possible as A_ In 
this direction, a qualitative characterization of possi-
Francese Esteva 
Pere Garcia 
Lluis Godo 
Artificial Intelligence Research Institute (IliA) 
Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) 
e-mail: {esteva,p�re,godo }@ceab.es 
bility measures was first given in [Dubois 86), where 
it was established a formal relation between possibil­
ity theory and qualitative possibility relations. Since 
then several logics of qualitative possibility have been 
proposed to allow specifying partial qualitative pos­
sibility relations and deriving consequences based on 
this partial information. Farinas and Herzig [Farinas & 
Herzig, 91] axiomatize the logic of qualitative possibil­
ity called QP L, introducing a conditional connective 
2:, and they relate it to the Lewis' conditional logic 
V N. They also propose a multi-modal logic based 
on sphere semantics to fully support possibility the­
ory. Boutilier presents in [Boutilier, 92] a possible 
worlds semantics for qualitative possibility relations 
and defines two modal logics, co and co·, and he 
makes use of two modalities to capture possibilistic 
logic. One corresponds as usual to truth at acces­
sible worlds while the other to truth to inaccessible 
worlds. Finally, in [Bendova & Hajek, 93] qualitative 
possibilistic logic is related to a tense logic with finite 
linearly preordered time called F LPOT, pushing fur­
ther some aspects of the previous works, specially the 
incompleteness of Q P L and the ptecise relation of the 
above modal systems with unary modalities to QPL. 
It is also worth noticing that similar attempts of re­
lating other quantitative and qualitative uncertainty 
measures have been proposed in the literature. See for 
instance [Segerberg, 71] or [Bacchus, 90] for the case 
of probability measures or [Harmanec & Hajek, 94], 
[Resconi, Klir & St. Clair, 92] for belief and plausibil­
ity measures. See also [Wong et a!., 91]. 
On the other hand, vagueness (fuzziness) concerns de­
grees of truth, usually numerical, and therefore one 
is led to many-valued logics as underlying formalism. 
In this sense, fuzzy logic deals with fuzzy propositions 
that may have intermediate degrees of truth and it is 
usually understood as truth-functional, i.e. the truth 
degree of a compound formula is a function of the truth 
degrees of its subformulas using suitable connectives. 
Because of this key feature, fuzzy logic departs from 
any uncertainty logic. 
So far, as argued elsewhere ([Godo & Mantaras, 93], 
[Hajek, 93], [Hajek & Harmancova, 93]), we have 
seen that qualitative uncertainty (possibility) leads to 
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modal logics, while fuzziness leads to many-valued log­
ics. Therefore, presence of both fuzziness and uncer­
tainty leads to calculi that are both many-valued and 
modal. Modal many-valued logics have been already 
investigated by some authors, see for instance [Oster­
mann, 88} or [Fitting, 92}. Our goal is to study logical 
systems of qualitative possibility dealing with fuzzy 
propositions. It is clear then that the first question 
one is faced with is how to compare formulas of fuzzy 
logic with respect to their possibility or, more general, 
with respect to the possibility measures of worlds on 
which they have a given truth-value. This question 
has not an unique answer. For instance, in a recent 
and very related works [Hajek & Harmancova, 93}, 
[Hajek, Harmancova & Verbrugge, oo] the possibility 
of a fuzzy formula is described by a fuzzy truth-value, 
i.e. a function that provides, for each truth-value c:r, 
the possibility of the fuzzy formula being a-true. The 
corresponding modal calculus QF L of comparison of 
possibilities is there shown to have a faithful interpre­
tation in a certain many-valued tense logic (with lin­
early preordered time), and thus naturally extending 
the results in [Bendova & Hajek, 93]. 
In the present paper we investigate qualitative fuzzy 
logics based on an alternative definition of possibility 
of a fuzzy formula, following the well known Zadeh's 
extension of classical possibility measures to fuzzy 
propositions (cf. [Zadeh, 78] [Dubois & Prade, 85]). 
With this definition, the possibility of a formula of 
fuzzy logic is again only one value. Furthermore, in 
our setting the possibility of a formula is just a truth 
value. To simplify matters, we make the following de­
sign choices: we investigate finitely valued Lukasiewicz 
fuzzy logics where the set Values of truth values co­
incides with the set of allowed possibility degrees. We 
show that this notion is useful to express statements 
about qualitative possibility comparisons. The corre­
sponding comparative logic QF £21 is shown to sat­
isfy reasonable axioms and to be closely related to 
the many-valued analogue MV 55 of the modal logic 
55. In Artificial Intelligence, 55 is often understood 
as the logic of knowledge whereas its weakening I< D45 
is understood as the logic of belief (cf [Voorbraak, 93}, 
[Halpern & Moses, 92}). We relate our calculi also 
to K D45 and its many-valued counterpart MVKD45. 
Completeness theorems for MV55 and MV f{ D45 are 
obtained. This is not a too surprising result; [Fit­
ting, 92] has much about completeness of many valued 
modal logics and [Ostermann, 88] too. But we present 
Hilbert-style systems and get their completeness. Cf. 
also [Nakamura, 91a, 91b] for a different approach. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the 
underlying many-valued propositional calculus is de­
scribed. In Section 3, possible world semantics for the 
qualitative fuzzy logic Q F L2 is introduced, while in 
Section 4 we prove its faithful interpretation on the 
many-valued modal MV55, also described in this sec-
1 The subindex 2 distinguishes our logic from the logic 
QF L of [Hajek & Harmancova] . 
tion. Finally, in Section 5 the logic MV f{ D45 is pre­
sented and proved that Q F L2 can be also faithfully 
interpreted there. We end with some concluding re­
marks. 
2 MANY-VALUED 
PROPOSITIONAL CALCULUS 
USED 
Fix a natural number n ;?: 2; we base our investigations 
over the n-valued propositional Lukasiewicz's logic Ln, 
as described e.g. in [Gottwald, 88]. This choice does 
not imply that we claim Lukasiewicz's logic be the only 
formal logical system for fuzzy logic. Our set of truth 
values is Values= {0, 1/(n-1), . . . , 1}. Principal con­
nectives are implication and negation, denoted respec­
tively by-+ and ...,, with Lukasiewicz semantics: ...,A is 
interpreted by 1- x and A-+ B by min(l- x + y, 1) 
where x ,  y E Values are the interpretations of A 
and B respectively; occasionally we write I(x, y) for 
min(l- x + y, 1). Other connectives are defined from 
-+and-,, in particular, there are two conjunctions and 
two disjunctions. We have the connectives 1\ and V, 
interpreted by min(x, y) and max(x, y) respectively, 
and & interpreted by max(O, x + y- 1), and its dual 
Y... interpreted by min(l, x + y). The equivalence con­
nective +-+ is interpreted by min(I(x, y), l(y, x)). A 
complete axiomatization of Ln extends the celebrated 
axiomatization of L00 [Rose and Rosser, 58] by some 
few additional axioms, namely: 
• A-+ (B-+ A), 
• (A_, B)-+ ((B-+ C)-+ (A-+ C)), 
• (...,B_,...,A)-(A-+B), 
• ((A_, B)-+ B)-+ ((B-+ A)-+ A), 
i=l i=1 
n-1 m m-1 
• L:cii Ay_(...,A& L A)), 
i=1 j=1 i=1 
for 1 < m < n - 1 such that m - 1 does not divide 
n-1, and where 2:::7=1 A stands forAY... . .  _n) . . . Y...A and 
07=1 A for A& . . . "l . . .  &A. Note the !-tautologies 
(A-. (B ___.C)),..... ((A&B) _,C) and (...,(A_, B)) ...... 
(A&-,B). Further note the !-tautology (A -> B) ...... 
( ...,B -+ ..,A). We extend Ln by unary connectives (co­
efficients) ( i) for each i E Values; the value of ( i)A is 
1 iff the value of A is i, otherwise the value of (i)A is 
0. In fact the connectives ( i) are definable in Ln, see 
[Ostermann, 88] or [Gottwald, 88]. Finally notice that 
Dienes and Godel's implications are also definable in 
Ln as -.A V B  and (1)(A-> B) V B  respectively. 
In the sequel, the constant True will stand for A -> A, 
False for -,True, and B0-formulas will be formulas 
generated from formulas of the form ( i)A using con­
nectives and coefficients. Clearly, each such a formula 
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is Boolean in the semantic sense: it takes only values 
1 and 0. (Later we introduce another class of formulas 
that are Boolean). We list next some axioms on formu­
las containing coefficients ( cf. [Hajek & Harmancova, 
93]); in fact they are provable (by definability of coef­
ficients and completeness of axioms for Ln)· 
v(i)A, A ,((i)A "(j)A), 
; i:f.j 
(i)A--+ (1- i)--,A 
((i)A 1\ (j)B) __. (t.(i,j))(A *B), 
for * being /\, V, & , Y._, - , +-+ and t. being the corre­
sponding truth interpretation, 
(1)A--+ A, 
for B0- formulas A, B, C: 
A+-+ (1)A, 
(A--+ (B--+ C))__. ((A__. B)__. (A__. C))2 
The only deduction rule is modus ponens. This ends 
our description of the underlying propositional calcu­
lus. 
3 KRIPKE MODELS, 
POSSIBILITIES 
Our possibilistic Kripke models over a set Atom of 
propositional atoms have the form 
[{ = (W, lh rr) 
where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, If­
maps Atom x W into Values, 1r maps W into Values 
and maxw EW rr( w) = 1. Recall that we consider possi­
bilities taking values only in Values. We extend If- in 
the obvious way to a mapping (denoted again by If-) 
of Forma x W into Values where Form0 is the set 
of all formulas of our propositional logic satisfying the 
usual inductive conditions. We write II A llw= i for 
If-( A, w) = i. Concerning satisfiability, we shall write 
wlf-A iff II A llw= 1. (Note II A llw= i iff wlf-(i)A.) 
The corresponding notions of validity and semantical 
entailment are the usual ones. 
After Zadeh ( cf. [Zadeh 1978], [Dubois & Prade, 86)), 
we introduce the following notion of the possibility 
degree of a {fuzzy) formula A E Form0 in a possibilis­
tic Kripke model, that extends to many-valued propo­
sitions the notion of classical possibility measure for 
two-valued propositions which plays a central role in 
possibilistic logic. 
2 Nate that this formula is one of famous axioms of the 
classical two-valued propositional calculus; it is sound for 
boolean formulas but not for all formulas. 
Definition 3.1 II(A) = supw(rr(w) 1\ II A llw)· 
The corresponding dual notion of necessity can be 
then as N(A) = 1- II( -,A)= infw(1- rr(w)V II A llw)· 
The idea behind the above definition is to use it in next 
sections to interpret in our comparative logic QF L2 
sentences of type B is at least as possible as A, being 
A and B many-valued, as II(A) ::; II(B). This inter­
pretation extends to the fuzzy (many-valued) case , in 
a different way than QF L, the comparison of possibili­
ties that is present in the qualitative possibilistic logics 
QP L, CO and F LPOT mentioned in the introduction 
section. However, it is worth noticing that other ways 
of extending the notion of possibility for fuzzy propo­
sitions have been also advocated; see [Dubois & Prade, 
92] for a discussion of such extensions. Next lemmas 
show a characterization of possibility measures II given 
by possibilistic Kripke models. 
Lemma 3.2 {cf. {Dubois fj Prade, 1988]} For each 
possibilistic Kripke model K, II satisfies the following: 
(IIl) II(True) = 1, II(False) = 0 
(II2) II(A VB)= max(II(A), II(B)) 
(II3) if Ln f-A+-+ B then II(A) = II(B) 
(II4) II(A) = V{i 1\ II((i)A)) 
i 
Proof" We only prove the last equality. II(A) 
supw(rr(w) 1\ II A llw) = sup;((supiiAII .. =i1T(w)) 1\ 
i) = sup;(i 1\ II((i)A). • 
Lemma 3.3 Assume the set Atom of propositional 
atoms to be finite. If a mapping II : Forma --+ [0, 1] 
satisfies the axioms (II 1- II4) of the preceding lemma 
then there is a finite Kripke model f{ such that II is 
the possibility given by f{. 
Proof" Note that (II4) guarantees that it is enough to 
produce a Kripke model f{ whose possibility coincides 
with II for B0-formulas. Now it is easily seen that each 
B0-formula .is equivalent to a Boolean combination of 
formulas of the form (i)p where p is a propositional 
atom. Therefore, we may produce a model f{ in full 
an'alogy to the two-valued case: each B0-formula B 
is Ln-equivalent to a disjunction of maximal elemen­
tary conjunctions of the form (\7':_1 (j; )p;, where m is 
the cardinality of the set Atom, thus for each such B 
there is a maximal elementary conjunction C such that 
II(B) = II(C). Thus we construct our model from the 
elementary conjunctions in the usual way. • 
Notice that, given a possibilistic Kripke model K = 
{W, If-, rr) over a set Atom of atoms, if p is a propo­
sitional variable not in Atom, I< clearly determines 
uniquely a model I<' = {W, If-') over Atom' = Atom U 
{p} such that If-' coincides with If- on Atom and 
lf-'(p, w) = rr(w) for each w E W. (K' has no ex­
plicit structure on W .) Models of the form {W, IH 
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will be called MVS5-models (for obvious reasons, see 
below). If ]{' = (W, It-') is an MVS5-model over 
Atom U {p} such that max{ll p llwl w} = 1 then it de­
termines uniquely a possibilistic model I< = (W, lh 1r) 
where If- is the restriction of If-' to Atom x W and 
1r(w) = lf-(p, w) for all w E W. We shall identify /{ 
and K' without any danger of misunderstanding. 
In the next section we shall introduce various modal­
ities defined in our Kripke models, among them the 
modality of comparison of possibilities. 
4 SOME MODALITIES, THE 
FUZZY LOGIC QF L2 AND ITS 
RELATION TO THE MODAL 
MANY-VALUED LOGIC MVS5 
We enrich our language by three modalities, 0, Op and 
<lp (for Atom' = AtomU{p}) and define their seman­
tics as follows. 
II OA l]w= max{ll A llw'l w' E W}; 
II OpA llw= max{ll pi\ A llw'l w' E W}; 
A <lp B is OrA- OpB 
the corresponding duals DA, DpA and A -<p B being 
defined as· -,0-,A, ....,op...,A and ...,{...,A <lp -.B) respec­
tively. 
Note that formulas OA, OpA and A <lp B take a con­
stant value independently of a given wE W. Thus we 
shall write from now on II OA II, II OpA II etc. Next 
lemma summarizes properties and relations among the 
above modalities; note that we work with models K' 
in which max(ll p llwl w) = 1, i.e. II Op II= 1. 
Lemma 4.1 The following properties hold for any 
formulas A and B: 
(a) II DA II= min{ II A llw I wE W} 
(b) II OpA II= II(A), 
II DpA II= N(A) 
{c) OpA is equivalent to O(p A A), 
DpA is equivalent to D( ...,p VA) 
{d) A -<p B is equivalent to DpA- DPB 
(e) II A <l p B II= 1 iff II (A) ::; II (B), 
II A -<p B II= 1 iff N(A) ::; N(B) 
(f) OpA is equivalent to True <l P A, 
DpA is equivalent to True -<p A 
where ll (and N) is defined by extension of definition 
3.1 to any formula in the obvious way. 
Thus it is clear that the modality Op captures the pos­
sibility n whereas the binary modality <lp captures the 
comparison of possibilities. Furthermore, the lemma 
shows that OP and <l P are interdefinable and both are 
definable from 0. So it makes sense, for our purposes 
of investigating the logic of comparison of possibilities, 
to axiomatize the D modality. This is our next task. 
First, observe that if a formula A is Boolean (takes 
only values 0,1) then OA is also Boolean; but of course 
OpA need not be Boolean. Define the class of B­
formulas to be the class of formulas resulting from 
formulas of the form (i)A, where A is an arbitrary 
formula, possibly containing modalities, using connec­
tives. Thus each B-formula is Boolean. 
Definition 4.2 The modal logic MVSS has the fol­
lowing axioms: 
• propositional axioms as in Section 2 but the ax­
IOms 
A..,_. (l)A, 
A- (B ___.C)- ({A___. B)- (A- C)) 
are postulated for all B-formulas, not only Eo­
formulas; 
• modal axioms: 
D(A -> B) - (DA - DB) 
DA ->A 
DA- DDA 
OA---+ DOA 
(� i)(DA) +-+ D(� i)A } Fitting- like 
(Clearly, (� i)A stands for Vr?.;(j)A .) 
Deduction rules are : modus ponens, necessitation and 
''from A infer (1)A ". 
Theorem 4.3 (Completeness). MVS51- A iff A is a 
1-tauto/ogy for MVSS-models. 
The proof is standard and sketched at the end of this 
section. 
Next step is to formally introduce our qualitative 
modal logic for comparison of possibilities of fuzzy 
propositions, and to faithfully embed it in MVS5 
Definition 4.4 The qualitative modal fuzzy logic 
QFL2 over a set Atom of atoms has formulas built 
up from atoms (propositional variables) using logical 
connectives and a binary modality <l; models are pos­
sibilistic models (W, lh rr) and the semantics is 
II A<] B II= 
= I(maxw(ll A l[w A7r(w)), maxw(ll B llw J\1r(w))). 
It is worth noticing that Jl A <l B II= 1 iff II(A) ::=::; 
ll(B). 
Definition 4.5 Given a variable p not in Atom, the 
translation of QFL2 formulas to MVSS formulas is de­
fined recursively as follows: 
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q* is q for q E Atom, 
(A ----> B)* is A* ----> B* and similarly for other con­
nectives, 
(A <l B) * is A* <lp B*. 
Finally define A •• to be ( 1 )Op ----> A • .  
Theorem 4.6 The above mapping ** is a faithful in­
terpretation of QF L2 in MVS5, i.e. a formula A of 
Q F L2 is a )-tautology iff A"* is a MVS5-tautology. 
Proof: Let K = {W, lh 1r) be a rriodel of Q F L2 and let 
wlf-(i)A. Then K' = (W, I�') constructed above is a 
model of MVS5 and K'lf-'(l)Op, wlf-'(i)A* and hence 
wlf-'A**. Thus if A** is a 1-tautology of MVSS, then 
A is a 1-tautology of QFL2. 
Conversely, let K1 = {W, I�') be a MVS5-model (of 
the language extended by p). If Kdf-'( < l)Op then 
clearly K1lf-'(l)A**; if I<d�'(l)Op then I<1 =I<' for 
the obvious I<. If wlf-'(i)A** then wl�'(i)A* and 
wlf-(i)A. Thus if A is a 1-tautology of QF L2 then 
A** is a 1-tautology of MVS5. • 
In the rest of this section we sketch a proof of the 
completeness of MVS5. 
Recall B-formulas; a theory is a set of B-formulas in­
cluding all formulas (1)C where Cis MVS5-provable. 
T f- C (T proves C) if there is a proof of C from T 
using only modus ponens (no necessitation). T is com­
plete if for each B-formula C, T f- C or T f- ...,c. As 
usual, it suffices to show the following Lemma. 
Lemma 4. 7 (M azn Lemma) If To is a complete the­
ory and T 0 f- ( i)A then there is a model /{ = {W, I�) 
and a wE W such that wiHi)A. 
To build such a model we need first some previous 
results. 
Definition 4.8 Let T and To be complete theories. 
We say that T and To are equivalent, written T Ri T0, 
provided that for each i and A, T f- ( i) DA iff T0 f­
(i)DA, or equivalently, T f- (i)OA iff To f- (i)OA. 
Lemma 4.9 MVS5 f- (i)OC----> (D(:S i)C 1\ O (i )C ) . 
Corollary 4.10 If To f- ( i)OC then 
(a) (VT Ri T0 )(T f- (:S i)C) 
(b) (3TRiT0)(Tf-(i)C) 
Proof: Easy, from compactness, like in [Hajek & Har­
mancova, 93]. • 
Now the definition of the model follows. 
Definition 4.11 For each i and C such that To f­
(i)OC, let Tc be a complete theory satisfying (b) in 
the above corollary. We define the model I<= {W, If-) 
such that the set of models is W 
= {To} U {Tc I 
C arbitrary} and the forcing relation is defined by 
Tlf-(i)p i!JT f- (i)p, for any T E W. 
Finally, completeness comes immediately from next 
lemma. 
Lemma 4.12 For each formula B, and each T E W, 
T f- (i)B iff Tlf-(i)B. 
Proof: Induction step for <> B: Assume T f­
(i)OB, T E W .  Then T f- D(:S; i)B, thus for each 
T' E W, T' f- D(:S i)B, thus T' f- (:S i)B (using 
DD ----> D), thus T'lf-(j)B for some j :S i, by the in­
duction hypothesis. On the other hand, T0 f- <>( i)B 
implies TB f- (i)B and by the induction hypothe­
sis, TBJf-(i)B. Hence i = max{jj B JITJ T E W}, 
i =II <>B II- This completes the proof of this lemma 
and of the Main Lemma 4. 7. • 
Corollary 4.13 MVSS is complete with respect to the 
given semantics. 
5 THE LOGIC Q F L2 AND A 
MANY-VALUED BELIEF LOGIC 
The QF L2 comparative modality <l introduced in the 
previous section relies fundamentally on the MVS5 
modality <>p. Therefore it seems interesting to inves­
tigate a possible axiomatization of the modality Op 
itself, without needing to refer it to any other modal­
ity. To this end, in this section we relate our QF L2 to 
a many-valued version of the belief logic K D45 (see 
e.g. [Voorbraak]). Our MV /{ D45 will be a subtheory 
of MVS5 (like f{ D45 is a subtheory of 55); if there 
are only two values (Values= {0, 1}) then MV K D45 
becomes K D45 like MV 55 becomes 55. Moreover, 
a faithful embedding of QF L2 into MV /{ D45 is very 
easy to define. 
Models of MV /{ D45 are again possibilistic Kripke 
structures /{ :::: (W, 1�, 11'), where 71' is a normalized 
possibility distribution on W with values in Values 
that can be understood as a many-valued accessibility 
relation R defined as R(w, w') = 1r(w' ). Such many­
valued accessibility relations already occur in [Fitting, 
92]. 
The semantics of the MV [{ D45 modalities D, 0 is as 
follows: 
IIOBII= maxw( IIBIIw l\1r(w) ), IIDBII=II-.0-.BII-
Next lemmas show the M V f{ D45-validity of some for­
mulas that will be taken later as axioms of our logic. 
Lemma 5.1 The formulas 
D(A----> B) ----> (DA --t DB), 
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DA ._... DDA, (j)DA ..... D(j)DA, 
OA ..... DOA, (j)OA ._... D(j)OA and (1)0True 
are }-tautologies. 
Proof: We only prove the first formula (axiom K). 
The rest are easily proved by straightforward compu­
tations. It suffices to show that 
II DA--+ DB 11211 D(A--+ B) II. 
We have in the one hand II DA -+ DB II= I( minw { 1-
7r(w) v IIAIIw},minw•{l - 1r(w') v IIBIIw•l) = 
maxwminw•I(l-7r(w) VII A llw, 1-1r(w') VII B llw,) 2: 
min wi(l-7r(w) VJIAIIw,l-7r(w) V IIB IIw), and in 
the other hand II D(A --+ B) II= minw{l-1r(w) V 
I(ll A llw, II B llw)}. Thus if we prove 
I(l-1r(w) v IIAIIw,1-1r(w) v IIBIIw) 2: 
2: 1- 1r(w) v I(I/AIIw, I!BII w) 
the lemma will be proved. But observe that: 
• I(l -1r(w)V II A llw,1- 1r(w)V II B llw) = 
min(I(1-1r(w),1- 1r(w)V II B llw), I( IIA llw' 1-
1r(w) VI!BIIw) = I( IIAIIw,1-7r(w) VIIBIIw) 2: 
I(ll A IJw , II B l w) 
• I(1-1r(w)V II A JJw, 1- 1r(w)V II B JJw) 2: 1 -
1r(w)V II B llw2: 1-1r(w) 
Thus the above inequality holds and the lemma too. 
• 
Recall the notion of a maximal elementary conjunction 
(m.e.c.) of the form /\7':1 (j;)Pi· Let I<= (W, lh 1r) be 
a possibilistic model and let E be a m.e.c. and A any 
formula. Then we have the following further lemmas. 
Lemma 5.2 There exists a unique j E Values such 
that for each w E W, w lf-E --+ (j)A. 
Proof: Evident for A atomic, induction step clear for 
connectives as well as for modalities (since the truth 
value of a m odalized formula is independent of w). • 
Lemma 5.3 KJf-(> O)O((j)A A E) --+ (E--+ (j)A) 
Proof: If I<IH> O)O((j)AAE) then there is awE W 
such that 1r(w) A II (j)A A E llw> 0, thus IJ (j)AAE llw= 
1, wlf-(j)A A E, so this j is the unique j of Lemma 5.2. 
Thus, for each wo E W, wolf-E --+ (j)A. • 
Lemma 5.4 I<Jf-((i)OA A E)-+(:::; i)(A A OE) 
Proo[- Assume wlf-(i)OA A E; then II OE II= 
max{1r(v) I vlf- E} = 1r(v0), and i = max,(1r(v) A  
IJAJJ,). Let j be such that (Vv)(vlf-E --+ (j)A); we 
have IIAAOE IIw=IIAAOE IIva (since IIAl w=IIAIIvo= 
j) and IJAAOEIIvo=IIAIIvo A7r(vo) :::;IIOAII= i. Thus 
JIAAOE IIw::; i. • 
Lemma 5.5 I<lf-(i)OA --+ V £(2: i)O(E A (i)(A A 
OE)). 
Proo[- If i = 0 it is obvious. If i = maxv ( II A 11, 
A1r(v)) > 0 then, it is easy to prove that, there ex­
ists vo and E such that II A JJ,o A7r(vo) = i, vol f-E 
and 7r(vo ) =II OE II· Therefore II A llvo A7r(vo) = 
IIAIIvo A IIOE II= i. Thus II E A (i)(A A OE) llvo= 
1, IIE A(i)(AAOE) IIvo A7r(vo ) = i, and therefore 
II O(E A (i)(A A OE)) 112: i. • 
Now we are ready to present our axioms of 
MVKD45. 
Definition 5.6 The modal logic MVKD45 has the 
following axioms: 
• axioms of propositional calculus (as above) 
• axioms of KD45: 
D(A--+ B)--+ (DA--+ DB), 
DA ..... DDA, OA ._... DOA 
• (j)DA ._. D(j)DA, (j)OA ._... D(j)OA, 
• (1)<>True 
• ((j)OA A E)--+(::; j)(A A 0£), (1) 
being E a m. e. c. 
• (j)OA-+ V E(> O)<>(E A (j)(A A OE)) , (2) 
for j > 0 and E being a m.e.c. 
Deduction rules are Modus Ponens, necessitation and 
"from A infer (1 )A". 
Previous lemmas 5.1 to 5.5 prove the soundness of 
MV I< D45. Therefore, the rest of this section is de­
voted to get the completeness results for our logic as 
well as the embedding of Q F L2 into M VI< D45 as 
mentioned before. The techniques are similar to the 
case of MVS5, i.e. for any formula provable in a com­
plete theory we can build a possibilistic model where it 
is satisfiable. First of all we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 5. 7 Let T0 be a complete theory such that 
T0 1- ( i)OC. Then 
(a) (VT � T0)(VE)(T 1- (E--+ (::; i)(C A OE))), 
(b) (:JT � T0)(:3E)(T 1- (E A (i)(C A OE))). 
Proof: (b - sketch) Assume To 1- (j)OC, j > 0. Then 
for some E, To 1- (> O)O(E 1\ (j)(C A OE)). Put D = 
(E 1\ (j)(C A OE)). Let To 1- (ir.)DBk , k = 1, ... , n; 
then To 1- D(ik)DBk and To 1- D/\�=t(ik)DBk (note 
that (ik)DBk is a B-formula!). Since MVKD45 proves 
OD-+ (DH--+ O(D A H)) for H, D being B-formulas, 
we get, for H = 1\(ik)DBk, To 1- OD - O(D A H), 
thus To 1- (> O)OD -+ (> O)<>(D A H), thus To 1-
(> O)O(D A H), and therefore D 1\ H is consistent3. 
3Recall that a formula A is MV K D45-consistent if 
MV K D45 fj-.A. 
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Consequently, D is consistent with the set of all To­
provable formulas of the form (i)DB, completing this 
theory we get our T. • 
This last lemma enables us to define our model as fol­
lows. 
Definition 5.8 For each i and C such that To 1-
( i)OC let Tc be a theory T as in (b) in the above 
lemma. We define the model (W, lh 1r) such that the 
set of worlds is W ={To} U {Tc I C}; forT E W, the 
forcing relation is defined by TH-( i)p iff T f- ( i)p, and 
finally, the possibility distribution is given by 1r(T) = i 
i!JT r E 1\ (i)OE. 
Completeness is obtained by proving next main lemma 
in a similar way as in lemma 4.12. 
Lemma 5.9 For each i, B, and for each T E W, 
Tlf--Ci)B iff T r (i)B. 
Corollary 5.10 (Completeness) MVKD45 is com­
plete with respect to the given semantics. 
Finally, QF L2 is related to MVKD45 in the way next 
theorem shows. 
Theorem 5.11 Define an interpretation of QF L2-
formulas in MV ]{ D45 by putting (A <l B)* 
(OA -+ OB) and extending trivially to all QF L2-
formulas. Then * is a faithful interpretation of Q F L2 
in M I<V D45, i.e. a QF L2-formula A is a QF L2-
tautology iff A* is a MV I< D45-tautology. 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have investigated, from a logical point 
of view, a modality for comparison of possibilities of 
fuzzy propositions. In this sense, this paper tackles 
the same problem as in [Hajek & Harmancova, 93] 
but with another approach. Taking as reference the 
Zadeh's extension of the concept of possibility mea­
sures to fuzzy propositions, the corresponding com­
parative logic QF L2 has been related to two many­
valued modal systems namely MVS5 and MVKD45, 
for which complete axiom systems, Hilbert style, have 
been given. However a number of open questions re­
main for future investigation. Some of them are listed 
below. 
(1) It would be desirable to replace axioms (1), (2) of 
definition 5.6 by some other more elegant axioms (in 
particular not dealing explicitly with m.e.c.'s). One 
tautology more similar to the axioms of MVS5 is 
(;?: i)DC ,..... (;?: i)D(;?: i)C. 
(2) Our choice of semantics of DA in MVKD45 might 
seem unnatural: 
II DA II= minw((l- 1r(w))V II A llw)- A seemingly 
more natural choice would be II DA II= minw ( 1r( w )) ---> 
II A llw) but then to have duality of D and 0 we should 
have II OA II= maxw(7r & II A llw) (strict conj unction). 
Unfortunately, for this semantics of D one of the basic 
axioms of modal logic, namely D(A -+ B) -+ (DA -> 
DB), is not a tautology. 
(3) To find an elegant (non-pedestrian) axiomatization 
of QF L2 in its own language still remains. As a matter 
of fact, it is worth noticing that some of the axioms of 
Farinas and Herzig's QP L logic, e.g. 
• (A<JB) v (B<l A) 
• (A <1 B)-+ ((A V C) <1 (B V C)) 
• A <1 True 
• -.(True <1 False) 
are 1-tautologies of QF L2 too, so they are potential 
candidates. 
( 4) Furthermore, one should give up the assumption 
that Values is finite and study the full Lukasiewicz's 
logic with real values. 
(5) The relationship between the semantics of the com­
parative modality in [Hajek & Harmancova, 93] and in 
this present paper it is also a matter of future research. 
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